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Available online 6 June 2009The neural mechanisms underlying the processing of conventional and novel conceptual
metaphorical sentences were examined with event-related potentials (ERPs). Conventional
metaphors were created based on the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor and were
operationally defined as familiar and readily interpretable. Novel metaphors were
unfamiliar and harder to interpret. Using a sensicality judgment task, we compared ERPs
elicited by the same target word when it was used to end anomalous, novel metaphorical,
conventional metaphorical and literal sentences. Amplitudes of the N400 ERP component
(320–440 ms) were more negative for anomalous sentences, novel metaphors, and
conventional metaphors compared with literal sentences. Within a later window (440–
560ms), ERPs associatedwith conventionalmetaphors converged to the same level as literal
sentences while the novel metaphors stayed anomalous throughout. The reported results
were compatible with models assuming an initial stage for metaphor mappings from one
concept to another and that these mappings are cognitively taxing.






How do people understand linguistic expressions such as “His
idea was half-baked”, “That class gave me some food for thought”,
and “The teacher spoon-fed them the information”? The Contem-
porary Theory of Metaphor (CTM, Lakoff and Johnson, 1980;
Lakoff and Turner, 1987; Lakoff, 1993) suggests that these
expressions are surface realizations of an underlying con-
ceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD1, and are understood via a
cross-domain conceptual mapping between IDEAS and FOOD.
The mapping consists of a fixed set of ontological correspon-
dences, such as “thinking is preparing”, “communication is
feeding”, and “understanding is digesting”. When thoseistics, University of Color
ai).
nguistics of using upper-c
er B.V. All rights reservedlinguistic expressions are used, the conceptual mapping is
activated so that IDEAS can be reasoned about in terms of
FOOD. Based on the CTM, conceptualmetaphors are important
because they reflect how abstract concepts may be structured,
and how abstract and concrete concepts are organized and
interrelated in our minds.
The metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD is conventional, i.e., in the
fixed part of the conceptual system, in English. There can also
be newly-coined examples which are not part of the conven-
tional patterns of mappings. Novel metaphors are possible
new ways of thinking, for example, “THEORIES ARE FATHERS”
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p53). Sentences derived from such
made-upmetaphors, such as “classical theories are patriarchsado, 295 UCB, Boulder CO 80309, USA. Fax: +1 303 492 4416.
ase letters (e.g. IDEAS) to refer to concept names, and lower-case
.
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depending on whether readers are able to arrive at some
creative interpretation.
Numerous behavioral studies have examined whether
metaphors and literal meanings are processed differently,
and most of them have contrasted indirect access models
(Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979) with direct access models (Gibbs,
1994, 2001; Glucksberg, 2003). The indirect access models
suggest that metaphorical meanings deviate from literal
meanings and cannot be computed until literal meanings
are refuted by the context. The direct access models suggest
that metaphorical meanings are as readily available as literal
meanings. Though a few studies found longer reading times
for metaphors than for literal statements and supported the
indirect access view (Ortony et al., 1978; Janus and Bever,
1985), the majority favored the direct access view and showed
that metaphors in context were read as quickly as literal
statements (Gerrig and Healy, 1983; Glucksberg et al., 1982;
Keysar, 1989; Blasko and Connine, 1993).
Based on the CTM, metaphors are different from literal
expressions because of the conceptual mappings. However,
the classic debate of direct vs. indirect access views does not
make clear predictions as to whether those hypothesized
conceptual mappings are activated during processing. On the
one hand, the CTM seems to be in line with the indirect
access view, because the metaphorical meanings are com-
puted by accessing literal meanings first, and mapping those
meanings from one domain to another domain. On the other
hand, the CTM is consistent with the direct access view,
because Lakoff suggested that conventionalized conceptual
mappings are “used with no noticeable effort” (Lakoff, 1993,
p.245) and should show processing demands equivalent to
those for understanding literal sentences. Therefore, we turn
to psycholinguistic models of metaphors, and contrast
models that require mappings (Gentner and Wolff, 1997;
Gentner and Bowdle, 2001; Glucksberg et al., 1997; Coulson
and Matlock, 2001) with models that require no mapping
(Giora, 1997, 1999, 2003; Giora and Fein, 1999; Frisson and
Pickering, 2001).
The Structure Mapping model (Gentner and Wolff, 1997)
proposes that metaphors act to set up correspondences
between conceptual structures of the target and base concepts.
The model proposes an initial stage of structural alignment
betweenconcepts, followedby inference importations fromone
concept to the other. For example, in “men are wolves”, the target
concept MEN and the base concept WOLVES are aligned by the
predicate “prey on”, and “men prey on women” is understood as
“wolves prey on little animals”. Gentner and Bowdle (2001) and
Bowdle and Gentner (2005) further proposes the Career of
Metaphor model, which suggests that conventional and novel
metaphors are processed differently. Novel metaphors such as
“science is a glacier” are understood as comparisons. As meta-
phors becomemore andmore conventionalized, there is a shift
in type of processing from comparison to categorization, i.e.,
assertions of category membership such as “a robin is a bird”.
What happens is that through repeated use, the base concept
acquires a domain-general category in addition to its original
domain-specific sense category. For example, the base concept
“jail” in “my job is a jail” can be a literal category or a name for an
ad-hoc, metaphoric category “situations that are extremelyunpleasant, confining and difficult to escape from”. When mapped
from the literal category, the metaphor processing remains a
form of comparison. Whenmapped from the ad hoc, metapho-
ric category, the metaphor is understood via a categorization
process. Based on these models, both conventional and novel
metaphors should be somewhat cognitively taxing due to an
initial stage for structural alignment (Gentner, Bowdle, Wolff,
and Boronat, 2001) that is needed for mappings. But novel
metaphors should be more difficult than conventional meta-
phors due to always having to compare concepts and generate
mappings on-line.
Giora (2003) proposed the Gradient Salience model, which
suggests that it is not the conceptual mappings or metaphori-
city, but the “saliency” of the linguistic expressions that
determines whether those expressions can be understood
rapidly. Salient meanings in this model refer to meanings
foremost in speakers' minds at time of speaking, and are
characterized by conventionality, prototypicality, familiarity,
and frequency. Conventional expressions such as “step on
someone's shoes” are salient and should be processed instanta-
neously like salient literal expressions. Novel metaphors such
as “her wedding ring is a ‘sorry we’re closed’ sign” are non-salient,
and are slowed in processing due to having to reject the literal
meanings of the phrases first. The model suggests that the
comprehension speeds for salient conventional metaphors
and literal statements should be the same. But conventional
metaphors should be comprehended faster than non-salient,
novel metaphors.
Event-related potentials (ERPs) can be effective in measur-
ing processing effort from conceptual mappings. ERPs are
synaptic potentials recorded from the scalp, which are then
amplified and time-correlated with the cognitive event of
interest. ERPs can be more sensitive than reaction times, as
equivalent processing time does not necessarily represent
equivalent cognitive effort (Coulson and Van Petten, 2002;
Kutas et al., 2006). In addition, qualitative differences in the
amplitudes, latencies, and topographies of ERPs can inform us
more about the underlying cognitive processes in conven-
tional and novel metaphor processing. One of the most
established language-related ERP components is the N400, a
negative-going wave starting at around 200–250 ms post
stimulus onset and peaking at around 400 ms. The N400 was
first observed in semantically incongruent sentences, such as
“He spread the warm bread with socks” (Kutas and Hillyard,
1980), and has subsequently been found in the processing of
meaningful stimuli such as words, non-words, music, and
pictures (Bentin et al., 1985; Rugg and Nagy, 1987, Besson and
Macar, 1987; Barrett and Rugg, 1990). Recently, the N400 has
also been reported in metaphor studies (Pynte et al., 1996;
Tartter et al., 2002; Coulson and Van Petten, 2002; Iakimova, et
al., 2005; Arzouan et al., 2007).
Pynte et al. (1996) compared familiar vs. unfamiliar
nominal metaphors in French (e.g. “ces combatants sont des
lions (Those fighters are lions)” vs. “ces apprentis sont des cruches
(Those apprentices are jars)”). They found that both familiar
and unfamiliar metaphors elicited larger N400s than literal
categorical statements (e.g. “Those animals are lions”). But in
subsequent experiments, they found that regardless of
metaphor familiarity, contextually appropriate metaphors
elicited an N400 smaller than the contextually inappropriate





Literal control Every soldier in the frontline
was attacked
WAR WAR
The path turned in a new
direction
ROAD ROAD
That was too much food to
digest
FOOD FOOD





Every point in my
argument was attacked
WAR ARGUMENT
Her life has a new direction ROAD LIFE
That was too much info to
digest
FOOD IDEA





Every second of our time
was attacked
WAR TIME
Their style has a new
direction
ROAD FASHION
That was too much love to
digest
FOOD LOVE
The anger he felt was
warm
FIRE ANGER
Anomalous Every drop of rain was
attacked
WAR WEATHER
The lawn has a new
direction
ROAD GARDEN
That was too much wind to
digest
FOOD WEATHER
The answer they gave was
warm
FIRE WORDS
147B R A I N R E S E A R C H 1 2 8 4 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 1 4 5 – 1 5 5ones. They concluded by arguing for a context-driven account,
which has no distinct processing stages or conceptual map-
pings. The account seems consistent with the Gradient
Salience model because contextual appropriateness can be
viewed as saliency.
Tartter et al. (2002) examined ERPs to sentence-final words
in novel metaphorical, literal, and anomalous sentences (e.g.
“his face was contorted by an angry cloud/frown/map”). They
found that the waveform for the literal condition diverged
from the other two conditions at 160 ms. The waveforms for
the novel metaphorical and the anomalous conditions
diverged at 280 ms. It was concluded that novel metaphorical
sentences were understood as anomalous expressions
momentarily, but were then meaningfully resolved in the
300–500mswindow. Our concernswith Tartter et al.'s findings
are that first, the sentence-final words (i.e. “cloud”, “frown”,
and “map”) differ across conditions, which may have intro-
duced confounding factors such as word frequencies. Sec-
ondly, the stimuli were amixture of sentential metaphors and
nominal metaphors (e.g. “the camel is a desert taxi” as a
nominal metaphor). The processing of sentential and nominal
metaphors may differ in that understanding the conceptual
category name (e.g. “taxi”) and the sentence terminal lexical
item (e.g. “cloud”) might require different comprehension
strategies. Lastly, Kutas et al. (2006) pointed out that Tartter et
al.'s results are complicated by the higher cloze probabilitiesfor their literal sentences, given that more expected words are
known to elicit smaller N400s.
Coulson and Van Petten (2002) proposed that both meta-
phor and literal sentences require the same process of
evaluating and selecting properties in the concepts involved.
For example, to understand the metaphorical sentence “after
giving it some thought, I realized the new idea was a gem”, the
concepts “idea” and “gem” needed to be analyzed in more
detail to achieve interpretation. To understand the literal
match of the metaphorical sentence, such as “the ring was
made of tin, with a pebble instead of a gem”, the mention of
“pebble” caused the concept “gem” to be analyzed more fully,
which required deep analytical processing similar to that in
metaphor processing. But to understand a general literal
sentence, such as “that stone we saw in the natural history
museum is a gem”, the concept “gem” did not need to undergo
as much analysis. Coulson and Van Petten's proposal was
supported by their findings that metaphorical sentences
elicited an N400 more negative than the literal-matched
ones, and that both had N400s more negative than the literal
ones. Of crucial importance for the present study, some
cognitive effort was needed for understanding metaphors
compared with literal sentences, possibly for structural
alignment and property importations as proposed in the
Structure Mapping model.
However, after examining the 10 stimulus items they
provided (Table 1, Coulson and Van Petten ,2002), we found
that 3 of 10 examples had double metaphors and 4 of 10 were
unconventional. Double metaphors coming from two very
different metaphor domains might have made their metaphor
condition more difficult. For example, in the sentence “The
independent prosecutor thought he was a bulldog, but he was
really more of a flea”, there are “bulldog” and “flea” personifica-
tions. Personifications were actually treated as novel meta-
phors in CTM (Lakoff 1993). Secondly, the stimulus items varied
in conventionality. For example, “He knows that power is a
strong intoxicant” is conventional to native ears while “My
crazy uncle says jokes are conversation's cayenne” is uncon-
ventional for describing “jokes”. Unconventional items might
increase the N400 amplitude while conventional ones might
reduce the amplitude in their metaphor condition. Therefore,
the multiple metaphors and the variations in conventionality
might have confounded the observed N400.
Iakimova et al. (2005) examined highly conventionalized
‘dictionarymetaphors’ in French (e.g. “Il est parti dans les nuages
(he is away in the clouds)”) in people with schizophrenia and
non-patients. They found that these dictionary metaphors
were not more difficult to process than the literals in non-
patients. Arzouan et al. (2007) examined conventional meta-
phorical word pairs (e.g. “lucid mind”) and novel ones (e.g.,
“conscience storm”) in Hebrew. They found that novel
metaphorical word pairs were more difficult to process than
conventional ones, and both were more difficult than related
word pairs (e.g. “burning fire”). They suggested that novel and
conventional metaphors appeared to be accessed similarly,
but differ in terms of processing difficulty. Both Iakimova et
al.'s and Arzouan et al.'s results are consistent with the
Gradient Salience model.
In summary, ERP studies on metaphors have produced
inconsistent results. Some studies found that metaphors
Fig. 1 – Mean sensicality judgments (perfect sense=3, some
sense=2, little sense=1, and no sense=0) for anomalous
sentences, novel metaphors, conventional metaphors, and
literal sentences. Error bars indicate the standard errors of
the condition difference.
Fig. 2 –Mean reaction times (from the onset of the targetword
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literals (Tartter et al., 2002, Coulson and Van Petten, 2002,
Arzouan et al., 2007). Others found that metaphors were no
more difficult to process than the literals (Pynte et al., 1996,
Iakimova et al., 2005). We argued that the inconsistency may
have resulted from a failure to keep the linguistic forms of
metaphor stimuli consistent (e.g. nominal vs. sentential
metaphors) and to distinguish amongmetaphors with varying
degrees of conventionality (e.g. unfamiliar metaphors, dic-
tionary metaphors).
The present study creates conventional and novel meta-
phorical sentences based on the CTM and with reference to
the examples available on the Conceptual Metaphor Home
Page2. For example, we extracted a conventional metapho-
rical sentence “every point in my argument was attacked”
from the conventional metaphor “ARGUMENT IS WAR”. We
created novel metaphors such as “TIME IS WAR”, and then
created examples that matched the syntactic structure and
the final word of the conventional one, such as “every second
of my time was attacked”. Anomalous sentences and literal
sentences were created e.g., “every drop of rain was attacked”
and “every soldier in the frontline was attacked” for
comparison. To ensure that conventional metaphorical
expressions are familiar and interpretable, and that novel
ones are unfamiliar but interpretable, we conducted pretests
of familiarity and interpretability. The example stimuli are
illustrated in Table 1. See Experimental procedures section for
pretest details.
Our predictions are as follows. If the Gradient Salience
model holds, there should be no N400 difference between the
conventional and literal conditions because they are equally
salient. The N400s should be more negative in the novel
metaphor condition than the conventional one, because novel
metaphors are less salient than conventional ones. If the
StructureMapping/Career of Metaphormodels hold, then both
conventional and novel metaphorical expressions should
show someN400 due to an initial stage of structural alignment
for conceptual mappings.2 Conceptual Metaphor Home Page (http://cogsci.berkeley.edu/
lakoff/).2. Results
2.1. Behavioral results
The sensicality ratings showed that during real-time compre-
hension, subjects found that conventional metaphors made
more sense than novel metaphors, and both made more sense
than the anomalous condition. There is a main effect between
sentence types [F(3,69)=336.1, p< .0005] (see Fig. 1). Pairwise
comparisons confirmed that each condition differed from all
others (conventional vs. literal [F(1,69)=21.948, p<.0005], con-
ventional vs. anomalous [F(1,69)=563.592, p<.0005], novel vs.
literal [F(1,69)=335.319, p<.0005], novel vs. anomalous [F(1,69)=
102.277, p<.0005], literal vs. anomalous [F(1,69)= 807.978,
p<.0005], conventional vs. novel [F(1,69)=185.692, p<.0005]).
The reaction times for the sensicality rating task were
noticeably longer than those in other metaphor research,
because participants were specifically told to delay their
responses until after 700 ms (200 ms word presentation
+500 ms dark screen) to suspend movement. Data were
analyzed with repeated measures of ANOVA and a main
effect between conditions was found [F(3, 69)=35.5, p< .0005]
(see Fig. 2). Pairwise comparisons indicated no differences
between the anomalous (1615 ms) and novel (1620 ms)
conditions, which were each slower than conventional
(1487 ms) (conventional vs. anomalous [F(1, 69)=21.491,
p< .0005], conventional vs. novel [F(1, 69)=23.437, p< .0005])
and literal (1377 ms) (literal vs. anomalous [F(1, 69)=24.336,
p< .0005], literal vs. novel [F(1, 69)=25.479, p< .0005]) condi-
tions, which differed from each other (conventional vs. literal
[F(1, 69)=15.825, p< .0005]).
2.2. Event-related potentials
Themean for the numbers of trials per condition per block per
subject included in the ERP analysis was 25 (range: 19–26;
median: 25), resulting in approximately 400 out of the 416
stimulus sentences (i.e. 100 sentences for each one of the 4
conditions) in the ERP analysis. Grand averagedwaveforms for
the sentence-final words in each of the four conditions at 63
electrode sites grouped into 9 groups (left anterior, anterior
midline, right anterior, left central, central midline, rightto the time when a sensicality judgment was made) for
anomalous sentences, novel metaphors, conventional
metaphors, and literal sentences. Error bars indicate the
standard errors of the condition difference.
149B R A I N R E S E A R C H 1 2 8 4 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 1 4 5 – 1 5 5central, left posterior, posterior midline, and right posterior)
are displayed in Fig. 3. The early perceptual components of
N100 and P200 could be observed clearly at the frontal and
central sites; they were followed by a negative deflection
starting at 320 ms, peaking at around 370 ms at all scalp sites,
which was identified as the N400.
Visual inspection indicated that the waveform for the
conventional metaphor condition diverged from the anom-
alous and novel metaphor conditions at around 440 ms and
then converged with the literal condition at around 560 ms.
Waveforms for the novel metaphors stay in line with the
anomalous condition throughout. Therefore, we considered
the activities over the 440–560mswindow separately from the
320–440 ms window.
Mean amplitudes from the 63 electrode sites for each
condition in each block for both time windows were entered
into a 2 time×4 condition×4 block×3 left/middle/right loca-
tion×3 anterior/central/posterior location repeated measures
of ANOVA. The Greenhouse–Geisser (Greenhouse and Geisser,
1959) sphericity correction was applied. There is no significant
interaction between condition×block [F(9, 207)= .727, p= .63] or
between time×condition×block [F(9,207)= 1.802, p=.11], so
repeating the target words across blocks had little effect.Fig. 3 – Grand average ERP waveforms recorded at 63 electrode sit
anterior, left central, central midline, right central, left posterior,Results confirmed that the patterns of conditions in the two
time windows differ significantly: time×condition interaction
[ F (3,69) = 9.738, p < .0005] . Furthermore, the time ×
condition×left/middle/right location interaction [F(6, 138)=
6.529, p< .0005] indicated that the topographic distribution of
the condition effects differed across the two times. The scalp
distributions of the effects in the two time windows are
displayed in Fig. 4 by subtracting the literal condition from
each of the other conditions. In the 320–440 ms window,
anomalous, novel, and conventional differences were all of
similar magnitude and similarly distributed over the central
scalp. In the later window, only the anomalous and novel
conditions differed from literal, as statistically supported
below.
Because of the time×condition×location interaction, sepa-
rate ANOVAs were conducted within each time window to
better understand each of these effects separately. Only
effects and interactions involving the condition factor are of
interest, so only these are reported here.
Results from the earlier window (Fig. 5, left) yielded a
significant effect of condition [F(3,69)=8.677, p< .0005] that
interacted with left/middle/right location [F(6,138)=3.104,
p< .05] and with anterior/central/posterior location [F(6,138)=es grouped into 9 groups (left anterior, anterior midline, right
posterior midline, and right posterior sites).
Fig. 4 – Topographic plots of anomalous-literal, conventional-literal, and novel-literal differences for the earlier (320-440 ms)
window (top row) and the later (440-560 ms) window (bottom row). The white dots are the 9 groups of electrodes for statistical
analyses. Note that cluster sizes are approximately equal, but inferior clusters appear larger in themaps because of the 3D to 2D
projection.
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plitudes for conventional and novel metaphors do not differ
from the anomalous condition [F(1, 23)=1.27, p= .26; F(1, 23)=
.57, p= .44]; and that conventional and novel metaphors do not
differ from each other [F(1,23)=3.542, p= .07]. The novel,
conventional, and anomalous conditions each differed from
the literal conditions (novel vs. literal: F(1,23) =22.536,
p<.0005; conventional vs. literal: F(1,23)=8.209, p<.01; anom-
alous vs. literal: F(1,23)=15.937, p<.0005;) The condition by
location interaction indicates that differences were greatest
near midline centroparietal locations, as is typical of the N400
(see Figs. 3–4).
Results from the later window (Fig. 5, right) also yielded a
main effect between conditions (F(3,69)=5.003, p<.01), but no
condition by location interaction (condition vs. left/middle/Fig. 5 – Comparison of means for the earlier window (320–4right location: F(6,138)=1.948, p=.11; condition vs. location:
F(6,138)=1.922, p=.13). Unlike the earlier window, post hoc
mean comparisons between conditions showed that the
waveforms for conventional metaphors and literal sentences
have converged [F(1,23)=1.257, p= .27] while the waveform for
novel metaphors remained equivalent to anomalous sen-
tences [F(1,23)=1.027, p=.31]. Conventional and novel meta-
phors differ significantly [F(1,23)=6.636, p<.05].
An analysis of cloze probability was carried out to demon-
strate that the effectwasnot drivenby clozeprobabilities of the
items. 146 additional participants were asked to do a cloze test
by completing each one of the 416 sentence frames with the
first word that came to mind. The literal sentences had higher
cloze probabilities (0.09) than the conventional metaphors
(0.04), the novel metaphor metaphors (0.02) and anomalous40 ms) (left) and the later window (440–560 ms) (right).
Fig. 6 – Comparison of means after controlling for cloze probabilities for the earlier window (320–440 ms) (left) and the later
window (440–560 ms) (right).
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reflected in theN400 analysis, we excluded items that received
higher cloze probabilities and conducted the same analysis
previously comparing early vs. late windows. The exclusion
criterion was that if more than one of the participants
completed the sentence frames with the target sentence-
final words, then that sentence was excluded. The remaining
items (368 sentences) were submitted for N400 analysis. The
results showed exactly the same pattern. Fig. 6 is almost
identicalwith Fig. 5: in the earlywindow, the anomalous, novel
metaphorical, and conventionalmetaphorical conditionswere
similar to each other, and all differed from the literal condition.
In the late window, the conventional metaphors converged
with the literal condition,while thenovelmetaphors remained
the same as the anomalous sentences.
As suggested by a reviewer, we sorted the ERPs according to
subjects' sensicality ratings. We contrasted novel metaphors
that received lower sensicality ratings (0 and 1 on a scale from
0 to 3) and those that received higher (2 and 3). It was found
that the mean amplitudes of the two sets do not differ
statistically from each other in either the entire 320–560 ms
window [F(1, 23)= .598, p= .45], the early 320–440 ms window
[F(1, 23)= .197, p= .66], or the late 440–560 ms [F(1, 23)= .888,
p= .36]. To be cautious, we excluded two subjects who did not
rate many novel metaphors as making some sense or making
perfect sense, and recomputed the analyses in the three time
windows. The results showed that still, the two groups did not
differ statistically from each other in either the entire 320–
560 ms window [F(1, 21)= .627, p= .44], the early 320–440 ms
window [F(1, 21)= .712, p= .41], or the late 440–560 ms window
[F(1, 21)=1.798, p= .19].3. General discussion
The main finding of the study was that while both conven-
tional metaphors and literal sentences were rated similarly as
familiar and interpretable, the ERP results showed that the
conventional metaphors required a short burst of additional
processing effort when comparedwith literal sentences. Novel
metaphors, which were rated unfamiliar and less interpreta-
ble, required a more sustained effort, similar to the effortobserved in anomalous sentences, which were rated unfami-
liar and least interpretable.
We intended to use the N400 as an index of semantic
processing in metaphor comprehension, but identification of
the N400 component was complicated by changes in the
pattern of experimental effects and topographic distribution
across the 300–500 ms interval typically assigned to the N400.
In the earlier window, ERP amplitudes were more negative for
anomalous sentences, novel metaphors, and conventional
metaphors as compared with literal sentences. In the later
window, conventional metaphors converged to the same
negativity level as literal sentences. We can confidently
associate the earlier window to the N400 because it shows
the standard difference between anomalous and literal condi-
tions, the window encompasses the peak of the negativity to
anomalous sentences, and the topography of the effects
conform to the typically observed centro-parietal distribution.
The identification of the later window is a more open
question. The later window may reflect the activity of a
distinct, later occurring process— as would be consistent with
the different pattern of effects and significantly different
topographic distributions. Alternatively, the later window
may reflect a continuation of the processes underlying the
N400, with condition differences reflecting the accrual of
additional information over time and topographic differences
reflecting summation with other later-occurring processes.
Critically, the interpretation of our results does not depend on
distinguishing these alternatives.
Our findings replicated Coulson and Van Petten (2002), who
found that metaphors (novel or conventional) elicited N400
more negative than literal sentences. We partially replicated
Tartter et al. (2002) in that their novel metaphors were
perceived as being anomalous momentarily, but our novel
metaphors continued to be perceived as being anomalous. We
also partially replicated Azouan et al. (2008) in that we showed
an effort for metaphors with varying degrees of convention-
ality in terms of the early vs. late difference, whereas they
showed such difference in the gradient of their N400
amplitudes. In contrast to Iakimova et al. (2005), who found
no N400 effect for the dictionary metaphors, we found
enhanced N400s for our conventional metaphors. We inter-
pret this by suggesting that dictionary metaphors may well be
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expression using the metaphoric sense of the base term is a
dead metaphor and will not seem metaphoric”. In other
words, the dictionary can be viewed as the graveyard of
metaphors (Boroditsky, personal communication). Lastly, we
found that conventionalitymatters, whereas Pynte et al. (1996)
found that the familiarity, which in our view is one of the
variables for characterizing conventionality, does not influ-
ence N400 amplitudes.
The current study seems to be consistent with the indirect
access view, at first sight. The conventional metaphorical
and literal conditions differ in their N400 amplitude, indicat-
ing a difference in processing effort. However, this difference
could be interpreted in two ways: Either the conventional
metaphorical sentences were difficult because the system
was busy rejecting the first available literal meaning and ret-
rieving the appropriate metaphorical meanings, or because it
was selecting among multiple meanings that were all
retrieved at the same time. In the former case, the literal
meaning was available first, and hence would be supporting
the indirect access view. In the latter case, all multiple
meanings are available as in the classic exhaustive access
view (Onifer and Swinney, 1981, Seidenberg, Tanenhaus,
Leiman, and Bienkowski, 1982), which would be consistent
with the direct access view.
Most crucially, are there conceptual mappings as hypothe-
sized by the CTM and are those mappings cognitively taxing?
Our data do not support models that require no conceptual
mappings. The Gradient Salience model is not supported,
because conventional metaphors that participants had judged
to be as interpretable and as familiar as literal sentences, and
which were therefore operationally “salient”, still elicited the
same size N400 in the earlier window as novel metaphors
which participants had judged to be non-salient. Novel
metaphors that participants had judged to be more inter-
pretable and sensible than the anomalous sentences, and
therefore more salient than the anomalous, still showed the
same size N400 as the anomalous throughout the early
and late windows. These results support models in which
conceptual mappings are in use to some extent during
metaphor comprehension. The Structure Mapping model is
supported, because our conventional metaphors still needed
more effort to process than literal sentences, consistent with
Gentner et al.'s (2001) claim that even highly conventionalized
metaphors required an initial stage for structural alignment.
In addition, consistent with the Career of Metaphor model,
understanding novel metaphors is harder than understanding
conventional metaphors, because novel ways of thinking
require comparing the concepts and creating conceptual
mappings on the spot.
The Career of Metaphor model also proposes a comparison
process for novel metaphors and a comparison/categorization
process for conventional metaphors. The current finding can
only establish that there are differences between conven-
tional and novel metaphor processing, and between literal
and metaphor processing. Our results cannot clearly distin-
guish which type of process underlies those differences, but
the finding that the conventional metaphors differ from the
literal sentences implies a comparison process for conven-
tional metaphors, which requires mapping to the targetcategory from a literal base category rather than from a meta-
phoric one.
The difference inN400 amplitude between literal sentences
and conventional metaphors addresses an additional issue of
what it is that the N400 indexes (see Lau et al., 2008 for a
detailed review). Some researchers have suggested that N400
reflects an ease of lexical meaning retrieval from memory
(Van Petten et al., 1999; Kutas and Federmeier, 2000; Van
Berkum, 2008, in press; Coulson and Federmeier, in press)
while others have suggested that the N400 reflects the
integration of lexical meaning with context at a post-lexical
stage (Brown and Hagoort, 1993; Chwilla et al., 1995; Hagoort et
al., 2004). If we define the earlier window as the pure N400,
then our results are inconsistent with the integration account,
because conventional metaphors should not require substan-
tial effort to integrate with the sentential context. However, if
we define the earlier and the later window together as the
N400window, then thewaveform for conventionalmetaphors
converges to that of the literal sentences, as would be
expected by the integration account.
Another way to view our results is that if the earlier
window is representative of the meaning retrieval process,
and the later window, the meaning integration process, then
our results would suggest that at the retrieval stage, it requires
effort to retrieve both conventional and novel metaphorical
meanings. In the integration stage, only novel metaphorical
meaning is difficult while conventional metaphorical mean-
ing is easily integrated with the rest of the context. Further
studies and elaborations of processing models will be needed
in order to determine the best interpretation of these data.
In conclusion, we observed several ERP differences in the
processing dynamics between literal, conventional and novel
metaphorical sentences. Our findings differentiating conven-
tional and novel metaphors supported an indirect access
processing model compatible with the Career of Metaphor
Theory.4. Experimental procedures
4.1. Participants
Twenty-nine right-handed native English speakers (19 men,
10 women, average age 19.7) in the University of Colorado in
Boulder participated in this experiment for course credit. None
had any neurological disorder or major head injury that was
diagnosed as having a long-term side effect. Data were
discarded from 5 subjects who had less than 15 acceptable
trials per condition per block due to blinking.
4.2. Stimuli
416 sentences (104 quadrates with 4 sentence types in each
quadrate) were created by two linguists (the first and third
authors) with reference to the CTM as described in the
Introduction. Conventional metaphors were more familiar
and interpretable. Novelmetaphorswere less familiar, but still
interpretable. Anomalous sentenceswere unfamiliar and least
interpretable. Within a given quadrate (see Table 1 for
examples), the same target word was used in all conventional,
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quadrates, the target words were comprised of 42 verbs, 41
adjectives, and 21 nouns. The mean length of sentences was
6.7 words with a standard deviation of 1.4.
To check whether the stimuli were familiar and inter-
pretable, two pretests were conducted (Blasko and Connine,
1993; Titone and Connine, 1994; Budiu and Anderson, 2002).
Thirty-eight native speakers of English from two under-
graduate classes in the Department of Linguistics at the
University of Colorado, Boulder, volunteered for participation.
Using Latin Square design, the 416 sentences (4 conditions/
sentence frames×104 target words) were divided into 4 blocks
so that each target word appeared only once in each block. As
a result, each block contained 26 conventional metaphors, 26
novel metaphors, 26 anomalous sentences, and 26 literal
sentences. Sentences in each block were then randomized. A
given participant saw all four blocks during the course of the
pre-test.
After participants signed the informed consents, they were
instructed to rate each sentences on two scales from 0 to 3,
first for the familiarity, and then for interpretability. The
instructions for the familiarity scale were: “If you have heard
similar expressions frequently before and feel that themeaning
is highly familiar, give it a 3. If you have heard similar
expressions occasionally before and feel that the meaning is
somewhat familiar, give it a 2. If you have heard similar
expressions once or twice before and feel the meaning is so-
mewhat unfamiliar, give it a 1. If you have never heard it before
and feel that the meaning is unfamiliar, give it 0.” For the
interpretability scale, the instructions were “If you feel that
the sentence is easily interpretable, give it a 3. If the sentence
takes you a while to come up with an interpretation, give it a 2. If
the sentence takes you a long while to come up with an
interpretation, give it a 1. If you couldn't think of an interpretation
that would make sense of the sentence, it's 0.”
Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) con-
firmed that familiarity ratings were significantly different
between sentence types [F(3,18)=256.3, p<.0005] (see Fig. 7, left).
Pairwise comparisons indicated no difference between conven-
tional metaphors and literal sentences (conventional vs. literal
[F(1,18)=3.7, p=0.1]), which were both more familiar than the
novel metaphors (conventional vs. novel [F(1,18) =71.3,
p<.0005], literal vs. novel [F(1,18)=74.8, p<.0005]), and the ano-Fig. 7 – Familiarity ratings (left) and interpretability ratings (right
metaphors, conventional metaphors, and literal sentences. Errormalous sentences (conventional vs. anomalous [F(1,18)=234.3,
p<.0005], literal vs. anomalous [F(1,18)=240.5, p<.0005]), which
differed from each other (novel vs. anomalous [F(1,18)= 61.3,
p<.0005]). The interpretability ratings were significantly differ-
ent between sentence types [F(3,18)=111.3, p< .0005] (see Fig. 7,
right). Similar to the familiarity results, pairwise comparisons of
the interpretability results indicated no difference between
conventionalmetaphors and literal sentences (conventional vs.
literal [F(1,18)=.04, p=0.8]), which were both more interpretable
than novel metaphors (conventional vs. novel [F(1,18)=71.3,
p<.0005], literal vs. novel [F(1,18)=74.8, p<.0005]) and the ano-
malous sentences (conventional vs. anomalous [F(1,18)=234.3,
p<.0005], literal vs. anomalous [F(1,18)=240.5, p<.0005]), which
differed from each other (novel vs. anomalous [F(1,18)=47.1,
p<.001]).
In the ERP experiment, each participant saw 104 anom-
alous sentences, 104 novel metaphors, 104 conventional
metaphors, and 104 literal sentences, split into 4 blocks. As
in the pre-tests, a Latin Square design was employed and a
particular sentence frame/condition and targetword appeared
together only once in each block. As a result, each block
contained 26 conventional metaphors, 26 novel metaphors, 26
anomalous sentences, and 26 literal sentences. Sentences in
each block were then randomized.
4.3. Procedure
Participants first completed a consent form, followed by
Sensor Net setup, a brief practice session, and then the main
experiment in a quiet room with white noise in the back-
ground and dim light. Sensor Net setup took about 20–30 min,
including placing the net on the subject's head, positioning
sensors, and adjusting/rewetting sensors to reach desired
impedance levels of less than 40 kΩ.
We partially replicated the paradigm of Coulson and Van
Petten (2002) in stimulus presentation. Each word in each
sentence was presented for 200 ms with a length-dependent
interword interval: 100 ms plus an additional 37 ms for each
character in the previous word. At the offset of the sentence-
final target word, a dark screen was presented for 500 ms
before a question mark “?” appeared. Upon seeing the
question mark, participants were to judge how much sense
the sentences make in English by pressing either one of the) on a scale from 0 to 3 for anomalous sentences, novel
bars indicate the standard errors of the condition difference.
154 B R A I N R E S E A R C H 1 2 8 4 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 1 4 5 – 1 5 5four keys (1, 2, 3, and 4) on the response pad (i.e., perfect sense,
some sense, little sense, and no sense). Participants responded
with the index andmiddle fingers of both hands. The order of
the key assignments (left to right vs. right to left) and the
order of the four blocks were counterbalanced across
subjects. Once a response was made, the program moved
on to the next trial. Instead of having a comprehension task
right after each sentence like Coulson and Van Petten (2002),
at the end of the EEG session, the sensor net was taken off
and participants were asked to do an interpretation genera-
tion post-test.
The purpose of the interpretation generation task was to
ensure that novel metaphors were all interpretable. In this
half-hour task, participants were given all 104 novel meta-
phorical sentences. Each sentence was presented entirely at
once and participants were asked to type inwhat they thought
the sentence meant within 20 s. At 20 s, the program
automatically switched to the next trial. The results from
the interpretation generation task suggested that all novel
metaphors were interpretable, but no formal analysis was
conducted due to the qualitative nature of these data.
4.4. Electrophysiological recording
Scalp voltages were collected with a 128-channel HydroCel
Geodesic Sensor Net™ connected to an AC coupled, 128-
channel, high-input impedance amplifier (200 MΩ, Net
AmpsTM, Electrical Geodesics Inc., Eugene, OR). Amplified
analog voltages (0.1–100 Hz bandpass) were digitized at 250 Hz.
Individual sensors were adjusted until impedances were less
than 40 kΩ. The EEG was digitally low-pass filtered at 40 Hz.
Trials were discarded from analyses if more than 20% of
channels were bad (average amplitude over 100 μV or transit
amplitude over 50 μV). Eyemovements were correctedwith an
ocular artifact correction algorithm (Gratton, Coles, and
Donchin, 1983). Individual bad channels were replaced on a
trial-by-trial basis with a spherical spline algorithm (Sriniva-
san et al., 1996). EEG was measured with respect to a vertex
reference (Cz), but transformed to an average mastoids
reference for analysis. Event-related potentials (ERP) were
obtained by stimulus-locked averaging of the EEG recorded in
each condition. ERPs were baseline-corrected with respect to a
200-ms pre-stimulus recording interval.Acknowledgments
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